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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This appellate review proceeding arises from the Utah Labor Commission's 
February 22, 2005, Order awarding Temporary Total and Permanent Partial 
compensation, medical expenses and attorney's fees arising out of an on-the-job 
injury. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2) (a) (1953, as amended), Utah Code Annotated § 34A-
2-801 (8) (1997) and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Has Appellant satisfied its obligation on appeal to marshal the 
evidence in support of the Labor Commission's Order and show that, despite 
supporting facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom that the 
Findings are not supported by substantial evidence? 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law. The Appellate Courts will not 
overturn the Commission's factual findings unless they are "arbitrary and capricious," 
"wholly without cause", or without substantial evidence to support them. Kearns v. 
Industrial Commission. 713 P.2d 49, 51. (Utah, 1986). Factual findings will not be 
overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion is 
permissible. Whitear v. Labor Commission. 973 P.2d 982 (Utah App., 1998). 
Further, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, § 63-
46b-16(4)(g) (1988) provides that: 
The Appellate Court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the 
agency's record it determines that a person seeking judicial review has 
l 
been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
• * * 
(g). The agency action is based upon a determination of 
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported 
by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court. 
Issue 2: Did Mr. Alexander's injuries arise in the course and scope of his 
employment with Salt Lake County. 
Standard of Review: Generally, "[Mjatters of statutory construction are 
questions of law that are reviewed for correctness." Esquivel v. Labor Commission. 
2000 UT 66, 7 P.3d 777 (Utah, 2000). The determination of the issue in this case, 
however, does not merely involve statutory construction. Rather, the determination 
requires an application of the terms of Utah Code Annotated, §34A-2-401 (1999) to 
the particular facts of this case. 
The Utah State Legislature has granted the Labor Commission "the full power, 
jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply the law. . ." to any 
adjudicative proceeding before it. Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-301 (1997). When "the 
governing statute makes an explicit grant of discretion to [an agency, the appellate 
court] appl[ies] a reasonableness and rationality standard, and may only overturn the 
[agency's] conclusions of law if they are unreasonable and irrational." Bernard v. 
Motor Vehicle Division, 905 P.2d 317, 320 (Utah App. 1995). 
In workers' compensation cases involving issues of mixed facts and law, the 
Commission's Findings and Conclusions are entitled to great deference, and its 
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Conclusions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. That is, whether 
the Commission overstepped "the bounds of reasonableness and rationality" in 
making that determination. 
Therefore, the Court will not overturn the factual findings in such a workers' 
compensation case, "unless they are arbitrary and capricious, or wholly without 
cause, or contrary to the one [inevitable] conclusion from the evidence." McKesson 
Corp. v. Labor Commission. 41 P.3d 468, 473 (Utah, 2002), quoting from Large v. 
Industrial Commission. 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah App., 1988). 
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope of the Utah 
Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize that the Act is to be liberally 
construed and any doubt as to compensation is to be resolved in favor of the injured 
worker. E.g., State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission. 685 P.2d 1051.1053 
(Utah 1984); and McPhie v. Industrial Commission. 567 P.2d 153,155 (Utah 1977). 
Preservation for Appeal: Respondent acknowledges that the issue of 
whether Mr. Alexander's injuries occurred in the course and scope of his 
employment was raised by Petitioner before the Utah Labor Commission. A Petition 
for Review was timely filed with this Court. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND RULE 
Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-401 (1999) is the applicable statute. It provides 
in relevant part that workers' compensation benefits shall be paid to: 
An employee ... who is injured ... by accident arising out of and in the 
course of the employee's employment... 
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The Statute is set forth in full in Addendum "A" hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: The Petitioner seeks review of the Utah Labor 
Commission's Order finding Mr. Alexander entitled to workers compensation benefits 
as the result of an automobile collision which occurred in the course and scope of 
his employment. 
Course of Proceedings: On January 28, 2003, Mr. Alexander filed an 
Application for workers' compensation benefits sustained as the result of an 
industrial injury on November 7, 2001. (R1 at 1). Salt Lake County, his employer, 
filed an Answer to the Application on February 27, 2003. (R1 at 10-11). Notice of 
Hearing was sent to all parties on July 1, 2003 setting Mr. Alexander's claim for 
Hearing on October 23, 2003. (R1 at 12). 
On April 16, 2004, Administrative Law Judge Debbie L. Hann entered her 
Findings of Fact and Interim Order referring the case to a Labor Commission 
Medical Panel on the issue of the medical cause of Mr. Alexander's right shoulder 
condition. (R1 at 43-49). 
On June 2, 2004, the Medical Panel issued its report finding that there was a 
"medically demonstrable causal connection between the Petitioner's (Mr. 
Alexander's) right shoulder condition and the 7 November 2001 industrial accident." 
The Panel gave him a 3% whole person impairment as a result of that injury. (R1 
at 54-67). Neither party filed any objections to the Medical Panel Report. 
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On February 22,2005, ALJ Lorrie Lima entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order finding that Mr. Alexander did suffer an injury arising out of and in 
the course of his employment. She awarded him Temporary Total and Permanent 
Partial compensation as well as medical expenses, travel allowances, interest and 
attorneys fees. (R1 at 83-91). 
Salt Lake County filed a Motion for Review with the Utah Labor Commission 
on March 21, 2005 (R1 at 92-154). The Appeals Board of the Utah Labor 
Commission entered an Order Denying Motion for Review on February 15, 2006. 
(R1 at 174-179). A full and complete copy of that Order is contained in Addendum 
"B" herein. 
A Petition for Review was filed by Salt Lake County with this Court on March 
13,2006. 
Statement of Facts: The relevant facts in this matter are simple, 
straightforward and not really disputed by the parties. A complete, detailed and 
largely unchallenged Statement of Facts is contained in the Appeals Board of the 
Utah Labor Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review, dated February 15, 
2006, (R1 at 174-179); See a/so, Addendum "B". 
1. On November 7,2001, Mr. Alexander was employed by Salt Lake County 
as a Lieutenant in the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, (he was, in fact, a 28 year 
veteran of the Sheriffs Office), where he supervised the Detectives Division. (R3 at 
25-26). He was on-call day and night, seven days a week, for investigation of 
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homicides and other major crimes. (R3 at 27). Even when off-duty, he was required 
to respond to calls, as well as responding to crimes committed in his presence. (R1 
at 83, R3 at 35). 
2. As part of his employment, an unmarked Sheriffs vehicle was issued to Mr. 
Alexander, as well as certain other law enforcement officers, "for use in the 
performance of their duties." The County policy allowed officers to use their County-
owned vehicles for personal travel, subject to some restrictions. (R1 at 36-41). The 
County provided all fuel, maintenance and repair for the vehicles. A copy of Salt 
Lake County's Rules and Regulations governing the use and responsibilities for such 
vehicles is attached hereto in Addendum "C." 
3. The County required that its off-duty officers be on 24 hour call and they 
were required to respond to crimes committed in their presence, police calls and 
other emergencies. (R1 at 38). Mr. Alexander had actually used his County-owned 
vehicle several times during off-duty hours to engage in law enforcement activities 
such as traffic stops and officer back-up. (R3 at 34). 
4. Salt Lake County benefited from its policy of assigning County vehicles to 
certain Sheriff Officers by having an increased number of Officers on the streets, 
faster response and, in general, increased police availability, including the benefit 
of sometimes having an unmarked car on the road. (R1 at 45). 
5. The Sheriffs vehicle was unmarked but was, nevertheless, fully equipped 
as a police car with a siren, forward and back deck lights and a police radio that 
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turned on automatically when the ignition was started. (R3 at 61). The vehicle was 
also equipped with a loaded M-16 rife, 12 gauge shotgun and Mr. Alexander's 
personal side arm. (R3 at 32-33). In addition, Officers were required to keep in their 
vehicles and carry with them at all times, their Sheriffs Officer identification and/or 
badge, a uniform, citation book, flashlight and flares. (R1 at 37). 
6. On November 7,2001, Mr. Alexander and his wife were northbound on 1-15 
at 12300 South, in Salt Lake County, in Mr. Alexander's Sheriffs vehicle. (R1 at 83, 
R3 at 28). Earlier that day, he had driven his wife to a medical appointment and he 
was now driving her to work in Salt Lake City, and from which he intended to drive 
to his workplace. (R3 at 35). He was dressed in his work clothes (he is not a 
uniformed deputy), and had his Sheriffs Office jacket and badge. (R3 at 61). 
7. On route to Salt Lake City, on 1-15, Mr. Alexander stopped his vehicle due 
to slow traffic. He quickly observed that the driver behind him would not be able to 
stop in time to avoid colliding with the rear end of his vehicle. He removed his right 
hand from the steering wheel and placed it in front of his wife so that she would not 
hit the dashboard. He kept his left hand on the steering wheel and braced himself 
for impact. (R3 at 29-30). 
8. The other vehicle did forcibly strike with the rear of Mr. Alexander's vehicle 
and his wife was knocked unconscious and was non-responsive. He called for an 
ambulance on his Sheriffs vehicle's radio. (R3 at 30). 
9. He timely reported the motor vehicle accident to his employer, the County, 
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and his resulting sore shoulder, which had began to hurt immediately after the 
collision. (R3at36). 
10. Following the car wreck, Mr. Alexander's wife had stroke like symptoms 
caused by a tear in her brain stem. She underwent considerable medical treatment. 
(R1 at 86, R3 at 38-40). 
11. Medical causation of Mr. Alexander's injuries was ultimately not disputed 
following Labor Commission Medical Panel findings. The Panel noted that there was 
a medically demonstrable causal connection between Mr. Alexander's right shoulder 
condition and the November 7, 2001, car wreck. The Panel further found that the 
treatment Mr. Alexander received for his right shoulder condition subsequent to the 
accident was reasonable and necessary. (R1 at 87). Neither party filed any 
Objections to the Medical Panel Report. Accordingly, the nature and scope of Mr. 
Alexander's medical treatment is not at issue herein and is omitted from this 
Statement of Facts. 
12. The County controlled officers' use of the County's vehicles in several 
ways. Under the official, written policy (R1 at 36-41, See also. Addendum "C") 
Officers were required to: 
(A). Monitor the police radios in their vehicles and respond to law 
enforcement situations, whether on-duty or off-duty. In fact, the 
vehicles had been modified so that the police radio automatically came 
on when the ignition was turned on; 
(B). Keep their cars clean, orderly and properly maintained; and, 
(C). Carry firearms, police identification, a uniform, flashlight, citation book, 
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and flares in the vehicle at all times. 
13. In addition, the County Policy prohibited Officers from: 
(A). Driving their vehicles outside Salt Lake County without prior 
authorization; 
(B). Using the vehicle for any activities inconsistent with the officer's 
obligation to respond to emergencies; 
(C). Allowing anyone other than a Sheriff's Office member to operate the 
vehicle; 
(D). Using their vehicles for recreational or vacation trips; 
(E). Using their vehicle if the officer or any passengers had consumed any 
alcohol within the previous six hours; 
(F). Transporting alcohol, except for official business; 
(G). Dressing "in any way that could bring discredit to the Sheriffs office, i.e. 
tank tops, reversed ball caps, earrings, day old beards, etc." While off-
duty officers were permitted to have civilian passengers with them, they 
were not permitted to respond to police calls with such passengers in 
the car. 
(R1 at 36-38, Addendum "C"). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although the County argues Mr. Alexander was yet not formally on-duty at the 
time of his automobile accident, the nature of his employment, his 24 hour on-call 
status, the control that the Employer exercised over his use of the Employer owned 
vehicle (during formally off-duty hours), together with the benefit which the Employer 
received from his use of the vehicle, all warrant the award of workers' compensation 
benefits to him. 
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The Labor Commission Order granting workers' compensation benefits to Mr. 
Alexander was reasonable and rational. While this is an issue of first impression for 
this State, the vast majority of jurisdictions who have considered a similar fact 
situation have awarded compensation. 
A R G U M E N T 
I 
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED 
LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL 
DOUBTS AS TO COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN 
FAVOR OF THE INJURED WORKER. 
Few principles of workers' compensation law are as well established in this 
State as that workers' compensation disability claims are to be liberally construed 
in favor of awarding benefits, and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be 
resolved in favor of the claim. Utah Courts have consistently reiterated this principle 
from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund. 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990); 
J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission. 661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983); Prows v. 
Industrial Commission. 610 P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. Industrial 
Commission. 567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977); Baker v. Industrial Commission. 405 P.2d 
613 (Utah 1965); Askrew v. Industrial Commission. 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M 
& K Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v. 
Industrial Commission. 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra, first discussed the proper 
construction of the Workers Compensation Act and the underlying purposes of the 
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Act, and stated as follows: 
[0]ur statute requires that the statues of this state are to be 
'liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and 
to promote justice.' 
* * * * * * 
In this connection it must be remembered that the compensation 
provided for in the act is in no sense to be considered as damages for 
the injured employee or to his dependents in case death supervenes. 
The right to compensation arises out of the relation existing between 
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of [or] in the 
course of the employment. Under such an act the costs and expenses 
of conducting the business or enterprise, including compensation for 
injuries to 'employees or other casualties, must be taxed to the 
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the whole cost 
and expense of conducting the business as aforesaid is added to the 
cost of the articles that are produced and sold, and hence, in the long 
run, such costs and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the 
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such an act, 
therefore, is to protect the employee and those dependent upon him, 
and in case of his serious injury or death to provide adequate means for 
the support of those dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in 
case of total disability or death of the employee his dependents might 
become the objects of public charity, such a calamity is avoided by 
requiring the business or enterprise to provide for such dependents, 
with the right of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the 
cost of producing and selling the product of such business or enterprise. 
The beneficent purpose of such acts are therefore apparent to all, and 
for that reason, if for no other, should receive a very liberal construction 
in favor of the injured employee. We are all united upon the proposition 
that in view of the purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt 
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should be resolved in 
favor of the employee or his dependents as the case may be. \± at 
1021-1022. (Emphasis added). 
The Labor Commission properly applied this principle and awarded benefits 
to Mr. Alexander. The Petitioner, however, apparently wants to disregard the 
preponderance of the evidence and facts and focus on an alarmist claim that: 
The Commission's ruling presents serious liability exposure for any 
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employer who allows any employee to operate a work vehicle, no 
matter on how limited a basis, on personal errands as long as the 
employee monitors the radio (or listens for the cell phone's ring) or 
carries work equipment or keeps a utility uniform on board, even for 
example, when transporting his child and team mates to a game, and 
regardless of the employee's testimony that he was not engaged in 
work-related activity at the time of injury. (Petitioner's Brief at 7). 
This case, and any ruling which this Court may subsequently enter, will be 
limited to its fact situation, which is not even remotely similar to the parade of horrors 
that Petitioner paints. When the facts of this case are reasonably applied to Utah 
law, let alone given a "liberal construction in favor of awarding benefits," it is clear 
that Mr. Alexander is entitled to workers' compensation benefits. As indicated below 
the vast majority of other jurisdictions and commentators who have considered this 
issue have come down in favor of compensation. 
II 
PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN 
SUPPORT OF THE LABOR COMMISSION ORDER AND THUS HAS 
FAILED IN ITS DUTY ON APPEAL. 
If Petitioner wishes to challenge the Labor Commission's Order, it is required 
to marshal all of the evidence supporting the Agency's Finding and show that, 
despite supporting facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, 
the Findings are not supported by substantial evidence given the record as a whole. 
Hales Sand and Granite, Inc. v. Audit Division, 842 P.2d 887, 893 (Utah 1992). 
The County has utterly failed to do so. Petitioner failed to even mention 
significant Findings made by the Administrative Law Judge and the Commission. 
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Many of those omitted Findings are pointed out in Respondent's Statement of Facts 
above. Although Petitioner does devote a single brief paragraph to a section entitled 
"Facts Supporting the Commission's Ruling" (Petitioner's Brief p. 8-9) that recitation 
is not only incomplete, it also completely fails to all include the required "reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn therefrom." 
It is well-established that a party challenging a lower Court or Administrative 
Agency's Findings of Fact has the burden of establishing that those Findings are not 
supported by the evidence and thus, are clearly erroneous. See. Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a); Cambelt International Corp. v. Dalton. 745 P.2d 1239,1242 (Utah 1987). In 
order to successfully challenge a Trial Court or Administrative Agency's Findings of 
Fact on appeal, a Petitioner/Appellant must list all the evidence supporting the 
Findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is inadequate to sustain the 
Findings, when viewed in a light most favorable to the Court/Agency below. See. 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998). 
Utah's Courts have stated that the marshaling process is not unlike being the 
devil's advocate. A Petitioner/Appellant may not merely present selected evidence 
favorable to his or her position without presenting any of the evidence supporting the 
lower Court/Agency's Findings. See. Whitear v. Labor Commission. 973 P.2d 982 
(Utah App., 1998). 
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of 
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supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the 
appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is 
clearly erroneous. 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inventory Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Marshaling the evidence on an appeal is a process fundamentally different 
from that of presenting their claims at the Hearing. As the Utah Supreme Court 
explained in Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82,100 P.3d 1177 (Utah, 2004), in a recent, 
extensive attempt to reiterate the requirements of marshaling: 
Appellants cannot merely present carefully selected facts and excerpts 
from the record in support of their position [citing cases]. Nor can they 
simply restate or review evidence that points to an alternate finding or 
a finding contrary to the trial court's finding of fact [citing cases]. 
Furthermore, appellants cannot shift the burden of marshaling by falsely 
claiming that there is no evidence in support of the trial court's findings. 
Id, at 1195. 
The Court went on to emphasize that, "If the marshaling requirement is not 
met, the appellate court has grounds to affirm the court's findings on that basis 
alone" and "we assume that the evidence supports the trial court's findings." ]a\ at 
1196. See also, Merriam v. Industrial Commission. 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991); Featherstone v. Industrial Commission. 877 P.2d 1251,1254 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) 
Rather than marshaling all the evidence in support of the Order, the Petitioner 
has referenced only some of the relevant facts and asserts that this is merely a case 
in which Mr. Alexander, a non-uniformed officer, was driving his police vehicle prior 
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to work hours and on a personal errand and, therefore, the accident did not "arise out 
of and in the course of employment" for purposes of workers' compensation benefits. 
This is a very constrained reading of the "going and coming" rule, for which police 
officers enjoy a notable exception. 
When an Petitioner/Appellant fails to meet the heavy burden of marshaling the 
evidence, the Appellate Courts are bound to assume the Record supports the Trial 
Court/Administrative Agency's factual Findings. In fact, Appellate Courts have 
shown no reluctance to affirm when the Appellant/Petitioner fails to meet its 
marshaling burden. See, Wade v. Stangl. 869 P.2d 9,12 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
As a result of Petitioner's failure to adequately marshal the facts and evidence, 
its Petition for Review should be dismissed. To rule otherwise would allow any party 
on appeal to supplant Findings of the lower Court or Administrative Agency with that 
parties' own purported Findings without marshaling evidence or meeting the 
substantial evidence test. 
Ill 
RESPONDENT WAS IN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF HIS 
EMPLOYMENT WHEN INVOLVED IN A CAR ACCIDENT. 
A. The "Going and Coming" Rule. 
It is not disputed, nor at issue herein, that injuries sustained by an employee 
are generally not considered to arise out of and in the course of employment for 
purposes or workers' compensation benefits, in the ordinary situation involving 
traveling between home and the employment premises, without anything more 
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involved. VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Commission. 901 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah App. 
1995). That, however, is not the fact situation presented here. 
The mere fact that an employee is going or coming to his or her work site 
alone is insufficient to determine that he/she is not entitled to workers' compensation 
benefits for an injury while so engaged. It is necessary to look beyond the mere 
"going and coming" and determine the nature and purpose of the trip, the amount of 
control the employer exercises, and any benefit which may have accrued to the 
Employer. 
Under Utah law, when the activity in which the employee is engaged 
advances, directly or indirectly, the employer's interests, and the employee is at the 
place and time where he or she is authorized to perform such activity, the employee 
is entitled to compensation, even if that activity also advances the employee's own 
interests, unless any benefit to the employer is negligible. (See cases cited below). 
As this Court has explained, that means that the activity must be "[wjhile the 
employee is rendering services to his employer which he was hired to do or doing 
something incidental thereto, at the time when and the place where he was 
authorized to render such service" and "An activity is incidental to the employee's 
employment if it advances, directly or indirectly, his employer's interests." AECIevite 
v. Labor Commission. 996 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah App., 2000), cert. den. 4 P.3d 
1289 (UT 2000). 
Examples of cases in which compensation is allowed in such situations are: 
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clearing a driveway at home, VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Commission. Supra: 
traveling between employer's business locations, State Insurance Fund v. Industrial 
Commission. 15 Utah 2d 263,393 P. 2d 397 (1964); driving a semi-truck tractor from 
home to the employer's business after cleaning and servicing the tractor at home as 
was the employee's usual practice, Kinne v. Industrial Commission. 609 P. 2d 926 
(Utah, 1980); starting a company truck to drive to the terminal after taking it home 
for the night, Moser v. Industrial Commission. 21 Utah 2d 51, 440 P.2d 23 (1968); 
driving the company vehicle to work where it would regularly be used, Bailey v. 
Industrial Commission. 16 Utah 2d 208,398 P.2d 545 (1965); driving to a post office 
to pick up the employer's mail before returning to the employer's premises after 
lunch; Kahn Brothers v. Industrial Commission. 75 Utah 145, 283 P. 1054 (1929); 
or driving toward home before dropping off materials at a location designated by her 
employer (although not after the materials have been dropped off). Drake v. 
Industrial Commission. 939 P. 2d 177 (Utah, 1997). 
B. Police Officers on Call. 
In this case, both an Administrative Law Judge and the Labor Commission 
determined that based upon the facts presented to them at the Hearing, that 
although Mr. Alexander was not formally on-duty at the time of his automobile 
accident, nevertheless, he was engaged in actions to materially benefit his employer 
and that such activities create a proper basis for an award of compensation as was 
made in this case. 
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Petitioner claims that: 
The Commission has carved out a new exception to the 'coming-and-
going rule,' in effect ruling that police officers' injuries arising from 
automobile accidents involving an agency vehicle are sustained as an 
accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment. 
Petitioner's Brief at 7. 
Nothing could be further from the case and Respondent Alexander has not 
advocated such a blanket rule. Although Petitioner cites a prior Labor Commission 
case (Ross v. Salt Lake City Corporation. Labor Commission Case No. 2003-0958)1 
which did award workers' compensation benefits to an off duty Salt Lake City police 
officer who was involved in an accident with her agency vehicle, there is nothing to 
indicate that the Labor Commission has adopted a blanket and hard and fast rule 
awarding workers' compensation benefits to any off duty police officer who is injured 
while driving a police vehicle. Rather, both the Ross case and this case 
demonstrate that the Labor Commission looks at the facts of each case and 
analyzes those facts to determine whether they meet the legal standard for an injury 
"arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment." 
Petitioner, in its Brief, cites Professor Larsen's well respected treatise on 
Workers Compensation law for the principle that an employee generally is not 
covered by workers' compensation benefits while going and coming to his/her place 
of work. (Petitioner's Brief at 16). Inexplicably, however, Petitioner fails to continue 
1
 Now on appeal as Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Commission. Case No. 20050774-CA. Oral 
argument was held was held before the Utah Supreme Court on this case on June 6,2006, and a decision 
is pending. 
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to cite the treatise for the law and public policy on the specific fact situation raised 
in this Petition for Review. 
Professor Larsen went on to note that the prevalent law regarding police 
officers injured during commutes, in police vehicles, is that compensation should be 
awarded. He notes: 
[l]t has been recognized that police officers are 'on call' in a special sense. 
That is, while the usual on-call employee is subject to the possibility of a 
specific summons emanating directly from the employer, the police officer 
may at any moment be 'called' into duty by the events taking place in the 
officer's presence, whether technically off duty or not. Awards have 
accordingly been made to officers injured in the course of an ordinary going 
or coming journey. 
Arthur Larson and Lex Larson. Larson's Workers Compensation LawS14.05[7] (Rel. 
83-11/99). 
Petitioner has acknowledged that "other states have fielded this issue," but 
then goes on to selectively cite only three cases, which are in the minority, not on 
point factually, and ignores the overwhelming weight of authority that such injuries 
are indeed compensable. Petitioner makes no effort to apply those cases to the 
specific facts herein, or to even explain why the minority view that it cites should be 
adopted by this Court. 
Petitioner's reliance on Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 2002 UT 4,73 P. 3d 
315 (UT 2003) in particular, is misplaced. First, Ahlstrom was not a workers' 
compensation case, but rather involved an issue of third party liability. The Supreme 
Court, in that case, was careful to indicate its decision should not be misinterpreted 
as applying to workers' compensation cases. During the course of its opinion, the 
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Court explained: 
Attempting to augment the coming and going rule, the Ahlstroms also 
argue that the "special errand" and "employer-provided transportation" 
exceptions to the rule should be imported from our worker's 
compensation jurisprudence and applied to negligence cases like this 
one. However, cases addressing workers' compensation rules, even 
when the issues are the same, are of little use in answering the 
question now before us. ]d. at 317. 
The Court further emphasized this factor in its footnote to that declaration: 
Although the coming and going rule was imported from our workers' 
compensation jurisprudence, we note that such portability, while 
sometimes appropriate, is not the rule in Utah. 
Scope of employment questions are inherently fact bound. The scope 
of employment question arises in both workers' compensation and 
negligence cases but the method by which the question is answered is 
markedly different. We have said that the Workers' Compensation Act 
'should be liberally construed and applied to provide coverage. Any 
doubt respecting the right of compensation will be resolved in favor of 
the injured employee.' . . . Negligence cases require proof by the 
preponderance of the evidence that the employee was acting within the 
scope of employment. With very different presumptions governing 
workers' compensation and negligence cases, it would not be wise to 
hold that the rules governing scope of employment questions in one 
area are wholly applicable to the other because the legal effect of 
identical facts may be different in a negligence case than in a workers 
compensation case. jd. at 317. 
Second, In Ahlstrom. the Utah Supreme Court was called upon to review a 
Partial Summary Judgment, in which it was required to consider the facts in a light 
most favorable to Salt Lake City, the party against whom the judgment as to liability 
had been granted. Conversely, in a workers' compensation case, the law is to be 
liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits and any doubt as to coverage is to 
be resolved in favor of the injured worker. (See also Point I above). 
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In Montgomery County. Maryland v. Wade. 345 Md. 1, 690 A. 2d 990 (Md. 
App., 1997), the Maryland Court of Appeals considered a program under a "PPV" or 
"personal patrol vehicle" program, extremely similar to Salt Lake County's. The 
Court upheld workers' compensation benefits awarded to Officer Wade for injuries 
sustained while operating her patrol vehicle, with the required equipment, and while 
monitoring her radio, as required, although she was off duty, not in her uniform, and 
on her way to her grandmother's house, with her grandmother as a passenger. 
As the Court explained, that program placed stringent regulations on those 
under the program including the obligation that the off-duty officers must: 
[c]arry a handgun, handcuffs, and department credentials, and equip the PPV 
with items such as flares [etc]. . . They must monitor the police radio, and 
may make traffic stops 'only when inaction would reflect unfavorably upon the 
department.' They must 'respond to incidents or calls for service which come 
to their attention through any of the following means: (1) on view; (2) citizens; 
(3) radio monitored activity of a serious nature occurring within reasonable 
proximity to their location.' kL at 992. 
The Maryland Court also noted the restrictions imposed under the program 
against the use of such vehicles for political purposes, secondary employment, use 
of bumper stickers, and various other activities, also similar to those imposed in the 
case presently before this Court. 
Based upon those factors, the Court upheld the determination that the injuries 
arose out of her employment because: 
Officer Wade's use of her PPV.. . was clearly incidental to her role as 
a patrol officer. The. . . department established a program whereby its 
officers were permitted to use their patrol cruisers as personal vehicles 
when not on regularly scheduled duty. It attached numerous and 
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detailed regulations to this privilege and encouraged off-duty use of the 
PPVs in order to, inter alia, alleviate budget and staffing concerns and 
increase police presence throughout the County. Officer Wade would 
not have been operating a PPV but for her employment and consequent 
participation in the program. Thus, because her injuries stem from her 
use of the PPV within the department's guidelines, the requisite causal 
link exists, and, under these circumstances, those injuries are properly 
considered to have arisen from her employment. ]a\ at 994. 
The Court then considered the second part of the question, as to whether she 
was acting in the "course of employment" at the time of the accident. The Court 
explained that this required her to be "performing those duties or engaged in 
something incident thereto" or she may not recover. The Court, again noting the 
guidelines and strictures imposed upon her by the employer whenever she was 
operating the PPV off duty, explained: 
The guidelines, in essence, outline additional responsibilities by which 
the participating officers are to abide upon penalty of, at minimum, 
expulsion from the program. Any time Officer Wade placed the vehicle 
in operation while she was not on scheduled duty, she was bound to act 
within those guidelines. Taking this view, she may, therefore, properly 
be considered to have been operating the PPV under the auspices of 
the department at the time of the accident and, thus, within the course 
of her employment. |a\ at 995. 
The Court specifically rejected the assertions of the County that the officer was 
not performing any police duty at the time of, or leading up to the accident and was 
therefore precluded from recovery by prior state case law. The Court continued: 
Upon entry into the vehicle, Officer Wade was required to abide by the 
program's numerous regulations. She was required to stop in particular 
circumstances or in response to calls for service. The duties and 
responsibilities concomitant to use of a PPV are in addition to those 
expected of a nonparticipating officer. As in Perry, this fact in no way 
lessens the work-related nature of a participating officer's use of a PPV. 
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• • * 
The County seems to intimate that, if the 'work' being performed is not 
required, injuries sustained in the performance thereof are not 
compensable, for failing to satisfy the requisite nexus. Certainly, a 
participating officer is not required to use the PPV while off duty, but 
the County developed the program precisely for such use in furtherance 
of its objectives . . . By its assertions and assessment of the 
compensability of Officer Wade's claim, the County appears 
affirmatively to disregard the department's motivation in providing the 
vehicles to the officers in the first instance. This belies traditional 
analysis of what is considered to be within the course of employment. 
Thus, while the County may be correct in stating that its off-duty 
officers are not required to operate their PPV's while off duty, if and 
when they do, they are performing a police function and should be 
compensated under the Act for any injuries sustained pursuant thereto." 
ja\ at 997. 
Maryland's decision in this regard are not alone. Other states, similarly 
recognizing the general application of the "going and coming rule," have still 
awarded officers workers' compensation benefits under similar circumstances. 
In Tiqhev. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dept. 110 Nev. 632, 877 P. 2d 1032 
(Nev., 1994), an undercover officer was injured while driving home after dinner with 
fellow officers, where they discussed their activities and anticipated future actions. 
The officer was on call, carrying a police beeper and driving an undercover Metro 
vehicle equipped with police radio. The Court noted that the "going and coming rule" 
does not apply under such circumstances to preclude workers' compensation 
benefits. As the Court explained: 
First, an employee may still be within the course of his or her 
employment when the travel to or from work confers a distinct benefit 
upon the employer. . . Tighe was driving home in his employer's 
vehicle and was subject to his employer's control at the time of the 
accident. The police radio and beeper provided a means for Metro to 
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summon Tighe in a time of need, and Metro benefitted from having one 
of its undercover officers driving in an undercover vehicle (T)here 
is substantial evidence in the administrative record to find that Tighe's 
injuries occurred within the course of his employment. Tighe was on 
call and driving a police vehicle equipped with a police radio, and he 
was prepared to respond to any public emergency he may have 
encountered. Id at 1035. 
In City of Springfield v. Industrial Commission. 244 III. App.3d 408, 614 N. E. 
2d 30 (III. App., 1999) benefits were awarded to a uniformed and armed officer 
injured while returning from lunch at home in an unmarked squad car provided for 
his use 24 hours a day, with a police radio in the car required to be activated at all 
times, and with a beeper. The Court explained: 
In this case, although claimant was not responding to any particular call 
or emergency, he had his police radio activated pursuant to department 
directive at the time the accident occurred. This serves to distinguish 
this case from those cited by respondent... In this case claimant was 
returning to duty after lunch and was not only subject to being 'on call'; 
he had his radio turned on and was 'on call' to the extent he would have 
responded in the normal course to any request for assistance or 
emergency he encountered. 
In this sense, claimant was not acting outside his employment-related 
duties or engaged in a purely personal diversion or enterprise. The 
principal issue, as we have indicated, was whether the employer, under 
all the circumstances, can be deemed to have retained authority over 
the employee. Actively monitoring the police radio during the course 
of claimant's return trip to the station is sufficient evidence upon which 
the Commission could draw the conclusion that the employer intended 
to retain authority over claimant at the time his injuries arose. 
Accordingly, the Commission's decision is not against the manifest 
weight of evidence. 1<± at 480. 
During the course of its decision, the Illinois Court found that the earlier Siens 
v. Industrial Commission. 418 N.E.2d 749 (III., 1981) and Wolland v. Industrial 
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Commission. 434 N.E.2d 1132 (III., 1982) cases from that jurisdiction were not 
applicable because they were not performing any job-related duties at the time of the 
accident, whereas the officer in the current case was not merely subject to "call" but 
"had his radio turned on and was 'on call' to the extent he would have responded in 
the normal course to any request for assistance or emergency he encountered." 
In Botke v. County of Chippewa. 210 Mich. App. 66, 533 N.W. 2d 7 (Mich. 
App., 1995) benefits were awarded to an officer injured while traveling home, in 
uniform, in radio contact with the department, and driving a fully equipped patrol car. 
The Court recognized its prior decision in Chambo v. City of Detroit. 269 N.W.2d 
243 (Mich. App., 1978) where benefits had been denied. The Court explained, 
however, that Chambo was decided under "the narrow facts" of that case. The Court 
then explained: 
The facts of the present case support the contrary conclusion. At the 
time of this accident, defendant Chippewa County clearly received a 
benefit from plaintiffs operation of the county's only active on-road 
patrol vehicle. Although the road traveled by plaintiff was mostly rural 
in character, the county received the benefit of deterrence of traffic 
violations by virtue of the presence of the marked patrol vehicle. 
Furthermore, although plaintiff was officially off duty, he was expected 
to respond to any incidents observed by him that necessitated law 
enforcement intervention. He remained in radio contact with defendant 
and was subject to immediate dispatch. Under these circumstances, 
we hold that the dual-purpose rule applies . . . Jd. at 8. 
In State of Delaware v. Glascock. 1997 DE 18262 (Superior Ct, Sussex, 
1997) death benefits were awarded for an Internal Affairs investigator for the 
Department of Corrections who was killed driving home in a state owned vehicle 
25 
equipped with a cellular phone and state police radio, which he was only allowed to 
use for work and driving to and from home. The Court explained that the going and 
coming rule did not bar that recovery and explained that, while it was not certain 
where he was headed at the time of the accident, even if he was heading home the 
recovery was still not barred because he: 
[W]as subject to unanticipated disruption at any time by the demands 
of his job. In addition to always wearing a beeper, he drove a State-
owned car with a police radio only when driving to and from work or 
when responding to a call. The presence of the police radio made him 
even more accessible to the Employer when he was going to or coming 
from work The combination of these factors makes it clear that the 
relationship between Glascock's on-call responsibilities and his 
employment was sufficiently close to support the Board's finding that 
Glascock was in the course of his employment at the time of his death, 
jd, at 84. 
In John Collier v. County Nassau. 1974 N.Y. 44576, 362 N.Y.S. 2d 52 (N.Y. 
APP, 1974) benefits were awarded to a police sergeant injured while a passenger 
with two other policemen in a police vehicle assigned to his unit. It was used for an 
extended period to travel between home and department, and he was often called 
to drive from home to a particular assignment area. The Court explained: 
Where the use of the employer's vehicle has been used by the 
employee over a period of time with the employer's consent and for the 
employer's benefit, the operation of the vehicle was directly related to 
the employment, and any injury occurring during such operation does 
arise out of and in the course of his employment, jd, at 53. 
In City of Sherwood v. Lowe, 4 Ark. App. 161, 628 S.W. 2d 610 (Ark. App., 
1982) benefits were similarly awarded to an officer for injuries received off-duty 
when he was armed and in uniform but off-duty, operating his personal motorcycle 
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equipped with police lights within his jurisdiction, even despite the absence of a 
police radio. The Court explained: 
The City of Sherwood derived a benefit from his presence on the city 
streets in uniform and operating the police-equipped vehicle. This 
benefit is not so tenuous as to require denial of coverage by workers' 
compensation. |g\ at 615. 
In Carrillo v. Workers Compensation Appeals Board. 197 Cal. Rptr. 425,149 
Cal. App.3d 1177 (Cal. App., 1983), the denial of an award of benefits was annulled 
by the Court with directions to grant the Petition for Reconsideration. There, a 
reserve officer was injured while driving to work from home in her private car, in her 
sheriffs uniform and badge, but without a sidearm, which would otherwise have been 
required to be locked up when she arrived at the Women's Honor Farm. The Court 
explained: 
If petitioner had observed any police matter other than a traffic 
infraction while driving to or from work, she was required by her 
employer's regulation to take appropriate action. Since petitioner was 
in full uniform, criminals as well as citizens in need of assistance would 
know upon observation that she was a law enforcement officer. id. at 
427. 
Finally, In Mineral County v. Industrial Commission. 649 P.2d 728 (Colo. App., 
1982) the Court upheld a Commission decision awarding benefits, despite 
arguments that the "to and from work" rule barred recovery, for an officer who drove 
to a restaurant in his official car, in uniform, after serving some papers, stopped for 
a short period at the Elk's club and was subsequently found lying on the sidewalk in 
front of the club's steps. The Court acknowledged it had previously stated in Rogers 
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v. Industrial Commission. 574 P. 2d 116 (Colo. App., 1978), that the officer's 
injuries were not compensable because "[t]he controlling factor is whether, at the 
time of the accident, the officer was actually engaged in the performance of law 
enforcement activities." 
However, the Court declared that "Rogers is distinguishable from the instant 
case" because of the "totality of the circumstances," including the fact that he was 
in uniform and was returning to his official car furnished by the employer, as well as 
the fact that he was the only member of that County's sheriffs department and could 
even be reached at home by sheriffs radio or telephone at any time of the day or 
night. 
Petitioner repeatly makes the claim that at time of his accident Mr. Alexander 
was "... no different from the thousands of commuters enduring Salt Lake County 
rush-hour in their drive to work" and that "The only connection the Sheriffs Office that 
Alexander had at the time of the accident was that he was occupying a Sheriffs 
Office vehicle." (Petitioner's Brief at 6). In order to make this naive assertion, 
Petitioner has to overlook substantial evidence found by the Labor Commission. 
The fact is that on the date in question, Mr. Alexander was far different from 
the other commuters. He was a sworn and highly trained Sheriffs Officer with 
approximately 28 years of experience. He was required by Salt Lake County to be 
monitoring the official police radio and to respond to violations of the law and 
emergencies. He had, in fact, done so on several occasions in the past. He was on-
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call, ready for action. 
He was not a private citizen driving his private vehicle. He was in an 
unmarked, but official Salt Lake County Sheriff's vehicle. The vehicle was fully 
equipped as a police car with a siren, deck lights and a police radio. It was also 
equipped with a rifle, shotgun and a handgun. Mr. Alexander was required to wear 
or keep in the vehicle his Sheriffs Office identification, uniform and citation book, all 
of which he had. He was not free to use the vehicle, like any private citizen could 
their own personal vehicle, as Salt Lake County imposed strict controls on where, 
when and how the vehicle could be used. 
For example, only Mr. Alexander was authorized to operate the vehicle. It 
could not be driven outside of Salt Lake County. He could not use the vehicle for 
recreational or vacation trips or for any other purpose or activity which would be 
inconsistent with the Officer's obligation to respond to emergencies. He could not 
use the vehicle if he, or any passenger had consumed alcohol within the previous six 
hours. In addition, even his clothing and grooming while driving the vehicle was 
controlled, with restrictions on certain attire and "day old beards." 
A Sheriffs vehicle was not provided to Mr. Alexander by Salt Lake County out 
of largess or as a fringe benefit of his employment. Rather, the County derived a 
significant benefit, supported by sound public policy, by having its Officers constantly 
driving fully equipped Sheriff's vehicle and available to respond to calls at a 
moments notice. Through this Policy, the County benefitted from having an 
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increased number of Officers on the streets, faster response time and greater police 
availability, as well as the benefit of having an unmarked car on the road - an 
advantage in certain situations. 
Under these facts, Mr. Alexander was hardly like the "thousands of 
commuters enduring Salt Lake County rush-hour in their drive to work." His special 
on-call status as a police officer, the nature and type of vehicle he was operating and 
the control and obligations imposed upon him by Salt Lake County all operate to 
take him out of the general "going and coming" rule and bring him within the purview 
of the Workers Compensation Act. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Mr. Alexander's injuries were suffered in the course and scope of his 
employment with the Petitioner. He was engaged in actions which materially 
benefitted his employer and such activities created a proper basis for the award of 
compensation as was made in this case. The Order of the Utah Labor Commission 
below, should be affirmed. 
DATED this 21st day of June, 2006. 
Brian Kelm 
Counsel for Steven A. Alexander 
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Addendum A 
Utah Code Annotated, § 34A-2-401 (1999) 
34A-2-401. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
(1) An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the 
dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in 
the course of the employee's employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the 
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid: 
(a) compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death; 
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for: 
(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services; 
(ii) medicines; and 
(iii) in case of death, the amount of funeral expenses. 
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, and 
hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this 
chapter shall be: 
(a) on the employer and the employer's insurance carrier; and 
(b) not on the employee. 
(3) Payment of benefits provided by this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, shall commence within 30 calendar days after any 
final award by the commission. 
Amended by Chapter 55, 1999 General 
Addendum B 
Order Denying Motion for Review 
Appeals Board 
Utah Labor Commission 
February 13,2006 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
ADJUDICATION DIVISION 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
TELEPHONE 801-530-6800 
STEVEN A. ALEXANDER, * FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
Petitioner, * 
Case No. 200389 
vs. * 
* Judge Lorrie Lima 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Respondent. * 
* 
* 
The above-entitled matter was heard before Debbie L. Hann, Administrative Law Judge, 
Utah Labor Commission, on October 23,2003. The petitioner was represented by Brian Kelm, Esq. ^ 
The respondent was represented by John Soltis, Esq. and T.J. Tsakalos, Esq. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE V 
c 
The petitioner, Steven A. Alexander, filed an Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor 
Commission on January 9, 2003, and claimed entitlement to medical expenses, recommended 
medical care, temporary total compensation, permanent partial compensation, travel expenses and 
interest. The petitioner's claim for workers compensation benefits arose out of an alleged industrial 
accident that occurred on November 7, 2001. The respondent's denied that the accident on 
November 7, 2001, arose out of and in the course of the petitioner's employment. 
On April 16,2004, Judge Hann issued a Findings of Fact and Interim Order and referred the 
issue of medical causation to a Labor Commission medical panel. On August 12,2004, the medical 
panel issued a report. A copy of the medical panel's report was mailed to the parties. No party filed 
an objection to the report and it is admitted into the evidence pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-
601. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Employment. 
The petitioner was employed by the respondent as a deputy sheriff in the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office. On November 7, 2001, the petitioner's average weekly wage was $1,338.50. He 
was married with one dependent child. The petitioner's weekly workers compensation rate was 
$554.00 for temporary total compensation and $369.00 for permanent partial compensation. 
2. Respondent's Policy Regarding Sheriffs Office Vehicles. 
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The Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office issued a written policy setting forth regulations 
governing vehicles issued to deputy sheriffs. Exhibit R-12. The policy stated in part that: 
Travel time will not be counted as time worked. This does not relieve a sworn 
employee from an obligation to check on the air or respond to a law enforcement 
situation. . . . 2-5-03.03(1 )(4). 
********** 
Office vehicles and equipment are issued to members for the use in the performance 
of their duties. It is the obligation of all members exercising control of these assets to 
safeguard them and use them within the limits of policy and good judgement. 2-8-
01.00. 
********* 
Deputy Sheriffs . . . assigned Sheriff's Office vehicles are subject to the following 
restrictions: 
(a) Vehicles will not be used for recreational or vacation trips. 
(e) Vehicles will not used for activities manifestly inconsistent with the obligation to 
respond to emergencies, such as heavy loads, objects protruding from windows 
or trunk, etc. 
(f) Vehicles may not be used for secondary employment purposes, except as 
transportation to and from the work site, except as otherwise authorized by Sheriff's 
Office policy. 2-8-02-04(2). 
********** 
Deputies will carry the following equipment with them in the vehicle at all times: 
(a) an authorized firearm. 
(b) Sheriff's Office identification. 
(c) a flashlight 
(d) a Utility Uniform 
(e) a citation book and 
(f) flares. 
2-8-02.04(4). 
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Dr. Beck released the petitioner to light duty on July 23, 2002, and he determined that the 
petitioner was medically stable on February 11, 2003. Medical exhibit 321 and 329. On June 30, 
2003, Dr. Beck assigned to the petitioner's right shoulder a four percent whole person impairment 
rating. Dr. Beck apportioned 50% of the petitioner's impairment to his pre-existing condition, or two 
percent whole person, and two percent whole person due to the November 2001, motor vehicle 
accident. Medical exhibit 331. 
In a September 17, 2002, letter to Salt Lake County Risk Management, Dr. Beck noted the 
petitioner's right shoulder symptoms significantly worsened following the November 2001, motor 
vehicle accident. He opined that at least 50% of the petitioner's right shoulder condition was the 
result of the accident. Medical exhibit 325-326. 
On September 22,2003, Dr. Richard Knoebel conducted an independent medical evaluation 
of the petitioner. Dr. Knoebel opined the petitioner's November 7,2001, motor vehicle accident was 
not the cause of his right shoulder condition. Dr. Knoebel based his opinion, in part, on the 
petitioner's delay in seeking medical treatment following the accident. Dr. Knoebel assigned to the 
petitioner's right shoulder a five percent upper extremity impairment rating. Medical exhibit 358-370. 
On October 14,2003, Dr. Ronald Ruff performed a review of the petitioner's medical records 
for the respondent. Dr. Ruff noted that "...it is impossible to say that these shoulder problems were 
not exacerbated by the accidents." Medical exhibit 356. 
On June 2, 2004, the Labor Commission medical panel opined that, in teims of 
reasonable medical probability, there was a medically demonstrable causal connection between 
the petitioner's right shoulder condition and the motor vehicle accident on November 7, 2001. 
The medical panel further opined the treatment the petitioner received for his right shoulder 
condition since November 7, 2001, was reasonable and necessary to treat his injury due to the 
motor vehicle accident. The medical panel assessed to the petitioner's right shoulder condition 
a five percent permanent physical impairment rating. It apportioned two percent whole person, 
of the impairment rating, to the petitioner's pre-existing condition and three percent whole person 
to the November 7, 2001, motor vehicle accident. The medical panel concluded that the 
petitioner was not malingering and he had a normal mental status. 
6. Temporary Total Compensation. 
It is undisputed that the petitioner missed work due to his right shoulder condition. The 
petitioner had right shoulder surgery on March 6, 2002, and he returned to work on August 6, 
2002. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The November 7, 2001, Accident and Scope of Employment. 
Section 34A-2-401(1) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides that an employee 
who is injured by accident "arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment... shall 
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be paid compensation." Travel to and from work is not generally considered to be "in the course of. 
. . employment." Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1985). 
in Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., the Court of Appeals cited the Utah 
Supreme Court and held: 
The major premise of the going and coming rule is that it is unfair to impose 
unlimited liability on an employer for conduct of its employees over which it has not 
control and from which it derives no benefit. Therefore, the major focus in 
determining whether or not the general rule should apply in a given case is on the 
benefit the employer receives and his control over the conduct. 
In the present case, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates the respondent's 
policy imposed substantial control and obligation on the petitioner both on and off duty. Although 
the policy allowed the petitioner to use his assigned sheriff's vehicle when off-duty, he could not use 
it for recreational or vacation trips or secondary employment, other than to and from the work site. 
The policy required the petitioner to monitor the police radio when operating the vehicle and respond 
to a law enforcement situation even if he was not on duty. On the day of the motor vehicle accident, 
the petitioner was dressed for work and he carried the mandated sheriffs equipment in the vehicle. 
The petitioner operated the vehicle as the policy proscribed including monitoring the sheriff's radio in 
the areas he traveled. Finally, the petitioner provided a visual law enforcement presence in the local 
community. The sheriffs vehicle was an instrumentality of the Sheriffs Office at all hours of the day 
and night when the petitioner operated it. Thus, the petitioner was performing for his employer a 
substantial service required by the respondent's policy. 
Based on the foregoing, the petitioner suffered an accident arising out of and in the course of 
his employment. The benefit the petitioner provided to the respondent was substantial both on and 
off duty when he operated his assigned sheriffs vehicle. Furthermore, the respondent had 
substantial control in the manner in which the petitioner operated the sheriffs vehicle both on and off 
duty. 
2. Medical Causation of Petitioner's Right Shoulder Condition. 
The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the petitioner sustained a preexisting 
injury to his right shoulder in fall 2000, for which he received medical treatment. Therefore, the 
petitioner is held to a higher legal standard under Allen v. Industrial Commission. 
The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that on November 7,2001, the petitioner 
was involved in a severe industrial accident when sheriffs vehicle that he was driving was rear 
ended on a freeway. A medical demonstrable causal connection existed between the petitioner's 
right shoulder condition and the industrial accident on November 7, 2001. The medical treatment 
the petitioner received for his right shoulder condition since November 7,2001, was reasonable and 
necessary to treat his right shoulder condition due to the industrial accident. 
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Based on the foregoing, the petitioner suffered an injury that was caused by an industrial 
accident on November 7, 2001. 
3. Temporary Total Compensation. 
The petitioner missed a total of 21.6 weeks of work due to the industrial injury he sustained 
on November 7, 2001. 
4. Permanent Partial Compensation. 
The preponderance of the evidence, based on an impartial medical panel, demonstrates that 
the petitioner suffered a five percent whole person physical impairment of his right shoulder. Two 
percent of the five percent whole person rating was apportioned to the petitioner's pre-existing 
condition. Three percent of the five percent whole person rating was apportioned to the petitioner's 
industrial accident. 
5. Travel Expenses. 
The petitioner provided no evidence concerning his travel expenses associated with the 
medical treatment for his industrially caused injuries. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondent shall pay the petitioner temporary total 
compensation at the rate of $554.00 per week for 21.6 weeks, for a total of $11,966.40, less 
attorney's fees to Brian Kelm, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-410. That amount is accrued, 
due and payable in a lump sum, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §34A-2-420(3) and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-1-5. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall pay the petitioner permanent partial 
compensation for a three percent impairment rating at the rate of $369.00 per week, for 9.36 weeks, 
for a total of $3,453.84, less attorney's fees to Mr. Kelm, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-412. 
That amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per 
annum, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-420(3) and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-1-5. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents shall pay all medical expenses reasonably 
related to the petitioner's industrial accident of November 7, 2001, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§34A-2-418, and the medical and surgical fee schedule of the Utah Labor Commission, and any 
travel allowances hereinafter incurred, pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-20, plus 
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-420(3) and Utah 
Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-13. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents shall pay the statutory attorneys' fees of 
$3,084.05, plus twenty percent (20%) of the interest awarded herein, directly to Mr. Kelm pursuant to 
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Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-309 and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 602-2-4. That amount shall be 
deducted from the petitioner's award and sent directly to the office of Mr. Kelm. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petitioner's claim for travel expenses is dismissed with 
prejudice. 
DATED THIS 22nd day of February 2005. 
UTAH LABOR C Q ^ S S I Q N 
LORRIE-tfMA v 
Administrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on February 21, 2005, to the persons/parties at 
the following addresses: 
Brian Kelm Esq 
350 S 400 E Ste 122-W 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
John P. Soltis 
2001 So State St Suites S 3400 
Salt Lake City UT 84190 
T J Tsakalos 
2001 So State St Suites S 3400 
Salt Lake City UT 84190 
UJAHLABOR COMMISSION 
Clerk, Adjudication Division 
POBox 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
Addendum C 
Salt Lake County Policy 2-8-00.00 
"Vehicles and Equipment" 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
2-8-00.00 VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT 
2-8-01.00 GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES 
(1) Office vehicles and equipment are issued to members for use in the performance of their 
duties. It is the obligation of all members exercising control of these assets to safeguard 
them and use them within the limits of policy and good judgement. 
(2) Any member who is responsible for the loss, theft, or destruction of Office vehicles and 
equipment, beyond normal usage, due to the member's misconduct, incompetence, or 
negligence may be disciplined. 
(3) Members will not alter or attach equipment to the existing wiring system. Changes in 
uniform wiring may only be done with the authorization of the member's Division 
Commander and the concurrence of the Communications Division Commander. 
Unauthorized changes may result in discipline. 
(4) Window tinting beyond factory specifications is not permitted except in circumstances 
where investigative needs require same. Approval for tinting must be approved by the 
members Division Commander. 
2-8-02.00 VEHICLES 
2-8-02.01 Vehicle Unit Number 
(1) All Office vehicles are assigned "unit numbers" for identification purposes. 
(2) Unit numbers shall be used whenever identification of the vehicle is necessary. 
2-8-02.02 Fuel 
State of Utah Fuel Network 
(1) To obtain fuel, each vehicle has been assigned a "gas card". Each individual fuel user has 
been assigned a "P.I.N. Number". Fuel may be obtained by following the directions at the 
terminal of any State of Utah Fuel Network station. A list o( authorized stations is 
available from the Sheriffs Fleet Management Unit. 
(a) Any questions or problems with the fuel system may be directed to 1-800-678-
3440 or 1-801-538-3440, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. 
(2) Other Fuel Services 
(a) Emergency purchase of gas or oil will be paid for by the member and a receipt 
obtained for petty cash reimbursement. 
(b) The State of Utah Fuel Network Gas Card may be used outside the County 
consistent with SOPPM 2-8-02.04. Authorized stations are listed in the State of 
Utah Fuel Network pamphlet. The pamphlet is available from the Sheriffs Fleet 
Management Unit. 
2-8-02.03 Washing Vehicles 
(I) Office vehicles will be kept clean and orderly. Members shall, however, use good 
judgement and wash cars only as frequently as is actually necessary. 
(2) Designated commercial car washes will be used. 
2-8-02.04 Use of Vehicle 
(1) All use of Sheriff s Office vehicles will be consistent with provisions of this policv. 
(2) Deputy Sheriffs and other members who are assigned Sheriffs Office vehicles are 
subject to the following restrictions: 
(a) Vehicles will not be used for recreational or vacation trips. 
(b) Vehicles will not be used outside Salt Lake County without Division 
Commander approval. 
(c) Vehicles will not be used outside Utah without the Sheriffs and County 
Commission approval. 
(d) Vehicles will not be used by deputies or passengers who are legally 
intoxicated or have consumed alcoholic beverages in the previous 6 hours. 
No alcoholic beverage will be transported except for official business. 
(e) Vehicles will not be used for activities manifestly inconsistent with the 
obligation to respond to emergencies, such as heavy loads, objects 
protruding from windows or trunk, etc. 
(f) Vehicles may not be used for secondary employment purposes, except as 
transportation to and from the work site, except as otherwise authorized by 
Sheriffs Office policy. 
(g) Vehicles will only be operated by authorized Sheriffs Office members. 
(3) Members are responsible for the proper care of an assigned Sheriffs Office vehicle. 
Maintenance of assigned vehicles by Fair Labor Standards Act (FLS A) non-exempt 
employees will be made on-duty, whenever practical. 
(4) Deputies will carry the following equipment with them in the vehicle at all times: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
an authorized firearm 
Sheriffs Office identification 
a flashlight 
a Utility Uniform 
a citation book, and 
flares. 
(5) When off-duty, deputies may dress appropriate for their activities. If such dress is 
inappropriate to represent the Office in an emergency response, the Utility Uniform 
will be worn. 
(a) Deputies shall not dress in any way that could bring discredit to the 
Sheriffs Office, i.e. tank tops, reversed ball caps, earrings, day old beards, 
0 0 0 8 3 3 
(6) When using Sheriffs Office vehicles off-duty, deputies will keep the police radio on 
and monitor radio traffic. If in the vicinity- of an Ln-progress crime or other emergency, 
the deputy will respond The deputy will notify Dispatch of such response. Such 
responses will be made without non-peace officer passengers. 
(7) Off-duty deputies will park and operate Sheriffs Office vehicles legally and will be 
responsible for any citation received. 
(8) Unattended vehicles will be kept locked at all times All weapons will be removed from 
the vehicle while it is being serviced. 
(9) Deputies on vacation leave in excess of 5 days, restricted duty, leave without pay, or 
suspension will coordinate the use of Sheriffs Office vehicles with their Division 
Commander. 
(10) When radio transmissions are required, and the deputy does not have a car number, the 
deputy's MIS number will be used. 
2-8-02.05 Seat belts. Air bags and Transporting Passengers 
(1) Seat belts 
Members are required to wear seat belts at all dmes when operating or riding in County 
vehicles. Members are required to insure that all passengers, including persons in 
custody, are seat belted when in County vehicles. 
(2) Air bag Guidelines 
(a) Drivers should wear the seat belt correctly, position themselves approximately 
12 inches back from the steering wheel, and keep hands to the sides of the 
steering wheel at the 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock positions. 
(b) Adult passengers seated in the front seat should wear the seat belt correcdy, 
and position the seat as far back as it will adjust to. 
(c) Children should ride properly restrained in the back seat whenever possible. 
Rear facing child seats should never be used in the front seat of a car equipped 
with a passenger side air bag. All child seats are best used in the rear seat. If 
a forward facing child seat must be used in die front seat, it should be properly 
secured and the seat should be moved all the way back. If older children (not 
using a child restraint device) must ride in the front seat, make sure they are 
always properly belted and the seat is moved back as far as possible. 
2-8-02.06 Inspections 
Division Commanders or immediate supervisors shall inspect the vehicles assigned under their 
command or supervision on a monthly basis, using the Vehicle Inspection Report. 
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2-8-02.07 Preventative Maintenance (?M) 
(1) The manufacturers of Office vehicles give instructions in warranties that diese vehicles 
must be maintained according to a specified schedule. 
(a) Patrol vehicles will be PM'd even/ 3000 miles. 
(b) Other vehicles will be PM'd every 4000 miles or three months. 
(2) When the vehicle is serviced, a sticker will be placed in the vehicle indicating the due 
date of the next PM. 
(3) PM servicing is the responsibility of the assigned member. If a vehicle is driven by two 
or more members, the day shift member will be responsible. 
(4) Vehicles shall be safety and emission control inspected annually in compliance with 
State law. 
2-8-02.08 Vehicle Repair 
(1) Vehicle Maintenance shall supervise the repair of Sheriffs Office vehicles. 
(2) When repair needs are detected in a vehicle, the assigned member will notify' Vehicle 
Maintenance and arrange for the vehicle to be received by Public Works. 
(3) This shall be the responsibility of the day shift member in situations where die car is 
assigned to two or more members. 
(4) When a vehicle has been repaired, Vehicle Maintenance will test die vehicle and will 
thereafter notify the member that the unit is available. If the vehicle is a Patrol unit, the 
supervisor will be notified instead of the member. 
(5) V/hen emergency repairs are required and are obtained, Vehicle Maintenance will be 
notified by memorandum. 
2-8-02.09 Wrecker Use 
(1) Towed County vehicles will be delivered to Public Works. 
(2) Dispatch will call a wrecker contracted to tow County vehicles. If a wrecker is not 
immediately available, the supervisor shall make arrangements to store the vehicle in 
a safe place until such time as die wrecker is available. 
(3) If the County contract wrecker is not available and the County vehicle must be towed 
from the scene, it may be picked up by a close commercial wrecker and stored until 
picked up by the County wrecker, as authorized by the supervisor. 
2-8-02.10 Line Units 
When a member needs a replacement vehicle because of repairs, etc., a line-car may be checked 
out from Public Works, if available. 
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